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Abstract. Iris biometrics is considered one of the most accurate and robust methods of identity verification. Individually 
unique iris features can be presented in a compact binary form easily compared with reference template to confirm identity. 
However, when templates or features are disclosed, iris biometrics is no longer suitable for verification. Therefore, there is a 
need to perform iris feature matching without revealing the features itself and reference template. The paper proposes an ex-
tension of the standard iris-based verification protocol that introduces features and a template locking mechanism, which 
guarantees that no sensitive information is exposed. 
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Introduction 
Among biometric verification methods, iris recognition is 
considered one of the most accurate and robust. Iris fea-
tures can be easily extracted from eye images and effi-
ciently compared. However, if biometric reference 
template or a set of biometric features are disclosed, the 
whole biometric system becomes useless for an individ-
ual, because biometric information cannot be cancelled or 
revoked as passwords. Therefore, there is a need to per-
form iris features matching without revealing either bio-
metric data acquired during the verification process or 
reference template from the database. This paper intro-
duces a privacy preserving system for iris-based biomet-
ric identity verification. First, we propose a method in 
which iris biometric templates stored by the authenticator 
are locked with the keys known only to the data owner. In 
this scenario, even when the database is compromised, no 
private information is exposed. Second, we introduce a 
privacy preserving verification protocol based on secure 
multi-party computation techniques.  
Iris Biometrics 
The iris is a collared ring around the pupil. The structure 
of the iris is determined during the fetal development of 
the eye and remains unchanged. On the contrary, the 
colour of the iris can change as a result of variable pig-
mentation in tissues. The main role of the iris is to control 
the size of the pupil and adjust the amount of light ente-
ring through the pupil into the eye interior. It is  
 
surrounded by the sclera, a white area of tissues and 
blood vessels, and is covered by a transparent layer called 
cornea. The whole iris is visible only when the eyes are 
wide open, as eyelids and eyelashes usually occlude the 
lower and upper part of it (Fig. 1). 
 
Fig. 1. An example of the eye image captured in infrared light 
with outer and inner boundaries approximated by non-
concentric circles (www.biometriclabs.pl) 
The possibility of using the iris to distinguish indi-
viduals is over 100 years old, but the first patent for the 
automated iris biometric system was obtained by Flom 
and Safir (1987). However, the most important work in 
the field of iris recognition was done by Daugman (1993, 
1994). He introduced first practically verified methods 
for iris image segmentation and unique feature extraction 
and matching, which along with slight modifications are 
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presently used worldwide and which are the reference 
model for other algorithms.  
For the purpose of biometrics, the eye image is cap-
tured in near infrared light with the wavelengths between 
700–900 nm. Special infrared illuminators and bandpass 
lens filters are usually used for acquiring an image of a 
good quality. Infrared light reveals the detailed structure 
of the iris better than visible light (Daugman 2004). The 
iris is usually modelled as a ring with an outer and inner 
border approximated by two concentric unusual circles. 
Figure 1 shows an example image acquired in infrared 
light with the iris and pupil approximated by two circles. 
Because the iris area is hardly ever fully visible, an addi-
tional mask is applied to the ring, which marks the areas 
where eyelids and eyelashes occlude the iris region. Op-
tionally, this mask also indicates image artifacts such as 
specular reflections from illuminators. 
After the iris region is isolated, it is mapped into the 
normalized pseudo-polar coordinate system (Daugman 
2004). Figure 2 shows the iris mapped into pseudo-polar 
coordinates. 
 
Fig. 2. An example of the iris image (a), the iris image 
converted to pseudo-polar coordinates (b) and occlusions mask 
in pseudo-polar coordinates 
Every point of the iris area is described by two co-
ordinates: angle α and radial distance r. When the pupil 
and the iris centre overlap, r is the normalized distance 
from the iris pupil centre, and α is the angle of the line 
crossing the point and the pupil centre.  
The resulting rectangular image has two important 
properties. First, mapping models linear stretches of the 
iris when the pupil contracts or dilates, which is regarded 
a good approximation of its nature (Wyatt 2000). Second, 
the eye or head rotation is equivalent to the permutation 
of points in coordinate α, thus these effects can be easily 
compensated. 
Most of iris biometric methods convolve the trans-
formed image with 2-dimensional filters designed to ex-
tract unique iris texture patterns. Many different filters 
were tested but the best results were obtained for Gabor, 
Log-Gabor, Haar and Laplacian of Gaussian filters 
(Daugman 1994, 2004; Chenhong et al. 2005; Chou et al. 
2006; Thornton et al. 2007; Yao et al. 2006). The result-
ing values are resampled and quantized. Daugman pro-
posed that only the sign of the filtered signal should be 
used as features. He introduced a binary iris summarized 
in a vector of 2048 bits and called an ‘iris code’. Many 
other solutions follow this approach as it allows the iris 
codes to be compared efficiently using bitwise operations 
(Daugman 1993).  
Matching the iris code is based on the Hamming 
distance measuring the fraction of the corresponding bits 
of two disagreeing binary vectors. Considering the fact 
that not all of the bits of the iris code are valid due to 
occlusions and other disruptions, it should be taken into 
account that the modified Hamming distance must be 
introduced. It can be implemented using three types of 
operations, including bitwise XOR (⊕), bitwise AND (∧) 
and bit counting and expressed as 
 ( ) ( ), , , ,i i i ii
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∑  (1) 
where x and y are two iris codes and w and m are occlu-
sions masks, the bits of which are set if the corresponding 
bits of the iris codes are valid. To account for eye rota-
tion, the Hamming distance is computed for several dif-
ferent permutations of the bits corresponding to the 
different angles of rotations. At the end, the minimal 
score is compared with the predefined threshold to check 
if verification is successful.  
Preserving Iris Code Privacy 
Vernam’s cryptographic system, known also as one-time 
pad is a type of the encryption method that has been 
proven to be impossible to crack if used properly (Shan-
non 1949). The main idea is that the plain text is en-
crypted with a substitution cipher using a secret random 
key. The size of the key must be equal to the size of the 
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plain text. As long as the key is truly random, and as 
large as the plain text, the resulting cipher text is also 
truly random.  
For binary data, the Vernam’s system of substitution 
can be implemented based on a cryptographically secure 
pseudorandom number generator and XOR operation. 
The pseudorandom number generator is used for prepa-
ring a key while XOR operation – for a random inversion 
of bit values based on the key bits. One-time pad is a 
symmetric encryption mechanism, as XOR operation 
when used twice with the same key reveals the original 
plain text. 
The main idea behind privacy preserving iris based 
verification is that the iris codes encrypted with one-time 
pad can be matched in the same way as the unencrypted 
ones. The Hamming distance of two iris codes before and 
after encryption remain the same, as long as the keys used 
to encrypt them are identical. It is because XOR opera-
tion used for computing the Hamming distance nullifies 
encryption in the following way: 
 ( ) ( )enc , enc , .x k y k x k y x y⊕ ⊕⊕ = ⊕ ⊕ = ⊕  (2) 
The biometric features of the same individual differ 
each time biometric measurements are done. For iris bi-
ometrics, this variability is mainly due to changing cap-
ture conditions and image processing. These processes 
introduce noise to the iris code. Whether noise is a user’s 
characteristic or not is still an open question. Neverthe-
less, we can assume that for each individual an ideal iris 
code x’ and specific noise measurement z exist. The real 
iris code can be expressed as XOR operation between 
ideal iris code x’ and noise measurement z. In this situa-
tion, noise determines the Hamming distance between 
two iris codes of the same individual. 
Now, if we use the same cryptographic key in one-
time pad cipher for different real iris codes of the same 
individual, we may reveal information about noise but the 
ideal iris code remains encrypted. The iris code matching 
routine will not only nullify encryption but also the ideal 
iris code. An adversary will be able to determine the 
character of noise but will deduce nothing about the ideal 
iris code.  
The presented encryption of the iris code has some 
other interesting features. The conducted experiments 
indicate that there is only about 100 to 200 bits of infor-
mation in the iris code in the Shannon sense (Daugman 
2005). This suggests that the bits of iris codes are strong-
ly dependent. One-time pad encryption removes bit de-
pendencies in cipher texts if the key used has its bits 
independent. As a result, the encrypted iris code will be 
indistinguishable from random data for an adversary. 
Two-Party Protocol 
The privacy preserving iris based biometric authentica-
tion protocol is based on the secure multi-party computa-
tion scheme and applies the one-time pad encryption of 
the iris code presented in the previous section. Two par-
ties involved in this process will be later called Alice and 
Bob. Alice represents a user who is willing to undergo 
biometric verification. She does not want her biometric 
data (namely the iris code and binary occlusions mask) to 
be disclosed to any other party. Bob represents an authen-
tication server verifying Alice identity based on her bio-
metric data. Bob has access to the encrypted biometric 
templates database, which he does not want to disclose to 
anyone.  
The authentication protocol presented in this paper 
employs several proven cryptographic methods. The first 
one is the cryptographic one-way function called a later 
hash function (Schneier 1996). It is a deterministic proce-
dure which takes an arbitrary binary vector and trans-
forms it into fixed size bit string, called a hash value. 
Transformation has some fundamental properties: it is 
easy to compute the hash, but it is infeasible to recover 
the binary vector from the hash value. It is infeasible to 
find two binary vectors with the same hash or modify the 
binary vector without changing its hash. A sample hash 
function suitable for our solution could be SHA-2. 
The authentication scheme uses also a secure chan-
nel establishment technique (Schneier 1996). There are 
many algorithms that can be used for that purpose. 
The protocol also requires a cryptographically se-
cure pseudo-random number generator (CSPRNG) hav-
ing a very long period, satisfying the ‘next-bit test’ and 
withstanding ‘state compromise extensions’ (Schneier 
1996). 
When Alice is enrolled into the biometric system, 
she uses a trusted biometric device capturing her iris im-
ages and generating her reference iris code with an op-
tional occlusions mask. Then, the cryptographically 
secure pseudo-random number generator creates a secret 
encryption key used for encrypting the reference iris 
code. The hash value of the key is computed and the key 
is released to Alice. The hash code is needed in the veri-
fication process to prove that Bob poses the encrypted 
template of Alice. Bob does not have access to the en-
cryption key. Instead, he receives the encrypted reference 
iris code with the associated mask and hash value of the 
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key. Bob inserts the hash value of the key and the en-
crypted template into his database indexed with identifi-
cation numbers. Afterwards, the system is ready for 
biometric verification. 
The verification process is described in Figure 3. 
When Alice wants to verify herself to Bob, she initializes 
a secure communication channel.  Then, she generates 
random number q and sends it securely to Bob together 
with her claimed identity i. Bob uses random value q and 
the hash value of i-th key to prove Alice that her template 
is in the database. Additionally, he generates random 
number o which will be used by Alice to prove that she 
owns the proper key. Bob sends Alice number o and 
proof h**. After the proof is checked by Alice, the bio-
metric system captures her iris image and extract her iris 
code x occlusions associated with mask w. The iris code 
is encrypted with secret key k and proof h* based on o is 
prepared. Encrypted iris code a* with occlusion mask w 
and proof h* are sent to Bob who verifies proof and cal-
culates the Hamming distance between the encrypted iris 
code from Alice and the corresponding encrypted tem-
plate from the database. If the Hamming distance is lower 
than the predefined threshold, verification is considered 
successful. 
Conclusions 
The presented methods allow authenticating an individual 
based on iris biometrics without revealing information 
about biometric features. These methods use the specific 
proprieties of the iris code and its matching routines, and 
employ proven and verified cryptographic techniques. 
The presented protocol can be incorporated into the exist-
ing authentication schemes. The author of this paper is 
working on the specification and reference implementa-
tion of the authentication server and client that will be 
used by the Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) 
family adapted to presented biometric requirements.  
Our future work will focus on investigating the 
noise properties of the iris code. It is essential for the pre-
sented protocol to discover how much individual-specific 
information is still present in noise, and what can be done 




Fig. 3. A sequence diagram for the privacy preserving iris based biometric authentication protocol with two parties 
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IŠSAUGANTIS PRIVATUMĄ, AKIES RAINELĖS ANALIZE GRĮSTAS, BIOMETRINIO TAPATUMO VERIFIKAVIMAS 
P. Strzelczyk 
Santrauka 
Straipsnyje nagrinėjama biometrinio tapatumo, nustatomo pagal 
žmogaus akies rainelės vaizdą, verifikavimo problema. 
Pasiūlomas egzistuojančio standartinio biometrinio asmens 
tapatumo verifikavimo protokolo plėtinys, kuris remiasi rainelės 
požymių ir šablonų užraktais. Parodoma, kad šio patobulinto 
protokolo taikymas garantuoja privačios informacijos, 
išgaunamos iš asmens akies rainelės, slaptumą. 
Reikšminiai žodžiai: biometrija, rainelės atpažinimas, 
privatumo išsaugojimas, autentifikavimas. 
 
